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This thesis examines newspaper coverage of the Wounded Knee massacre, which 
occurred in December 1890, and the takeover of Wounded Knee, S.D., by members of 
the American Indian Movement in 1973. In 1890, 21 reporters covered the massacre in 
which 25 soldiers and 250 Indians were killed, while dozens of radio, television and 
newspaper reporters covered the 1973 siege in which two Indians were killed. Some 
historians say newspaper coverage leading up to the massacre, including sensational, 
false stories about Indians attacking settlers, contributed to Indian agent Dr. D.F. Royer’s 
calling upon the military to suppress a feared Indian rebellion, a decision that led to the 
massacre at Wounded Knee. The mostly white journalists who covered the massacre 
largely failed to interview the Indian survivors, many of who couldn’t speak English. In 
1973, journalists provided much more balanced coverage of the Indian activists’ and 
government’s perspectives. The Indians in 1973 actively manipulated the media, and 
many Indian reporters even covered the event for Indian publications.
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Introduction 
The obelisk bears names, so many names engraved deeply into its gray stone skin. 
Names of men, women and children. Names like Wolf Skin Necklace, Bird Shakes and 
Big Skirt. 
To many who have passed through the arched gate at Wounded Knee Cemetery, 
these names are simply the slaughtered, a tired and hungry band of Miniconjou Lakota 
killed on that unseasonably warm day in December 1890. To the Lakota, they are the 
oyate, the people. So much more than frozen, stiff bodies found in the dirty snow. So 
much more than faceless names on a stone marker. 
The last conflict of the Indian Wars began Dec. 28, 1890, when the Seventh 
Cavalry caught Chief Big Foot’s band of Miniconjou Sioux near Wounded Knee Creek 
on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation. The Seventh was the same division that had been 
wiped out at the Little Bighorn Battlefield along with its flamboyant commander, Lt. Col. 
George Armstrong Custer, 14 years earlier by Lakota, Cheyenne and Arapaho under 
Chief Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse. On Dec. 29, as the cavalry soldiers attempted to 
disarm the Indians, a shot rang out and all hell broke loose. About an hour later, nearly 25 
soldiers and 250 Indian men, women and children lay dead or dying. 
And so the Lakota returned to Wounded Knee in 1973, to fight again for their 
people and to honor the sacrifices made by so many so that their children’s children 
might live. They brought with them the eyes and ears of a nation that had watched 
wearily for nearly a century as the Lakota and their Indian brethren wasted away on 
reservations, their cultures and religions stifled by governmental and religious 
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oppression, their governments corrupted by tribal leaders and federal officials seeking to 
control and gain economic benefit from tribes. 1 
For this paper, I have examined daily newspaper coverage of the 1890 Wounded 
Knee massacre and the 1973 takeover of Wounded Knee, as well as literature that was 
written after both events, including books, magazine articles and articles written for 
scholarly journals. I focused my examination of the 1890 massacre on five Nebraska 
newspapers: the Omaha Daily Bee, the Omaha World-Herald, the Lincoln Evening News, 
the Nebraska State Journal (Lincoln) and the Dawes County Journal (Chadron). All five 
of these newspapers sent reporters to the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation to cover the 
events leading up to the massacre, and three of them had reporters at or near Wounded 
Knee Creek when the massacre occurred. 
I focused my examination of the 1973 Wounded Knee siege on the Omaha 
World-Herald, the Lincoln Evening Journal, the Lincoln Star, the New York Times and 
the Chadron Record. Each of those newspapers sent correspondents to cover the siege. 
However, unlike the 1890 siege, none of those newspapers had reporters at the scene 
when Indian activists took over the village of Wounded Knee. That’s likely because the 
grinding violence between the Indian activists and supporters of Oglala Sioux President 
Dick Wilson that eventually led to the takeover didn’t offer the same sensational images 
and rich historical context that the takeover of Wounded Knee readily provided. 
To better understand both events, I also have examined literature written about 
both events. Most of the literature written after the Wounded Knee massacre has come 
from historians. The literature written after the 1973 siege has included books written by 
historians and by several Indian activists involved in the siege who attempted to present 
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their version of the 1973 event. The literature that has examined the 1973 takeover also 
has examined the methods and impact of television coverage of that event. Much of the 
literature I examined that was written about the media’s methods of covering the 
Wounded Knee siege has come from magazines, such as Harper’s and Time. 
Based on the literature that has been written about the Wounded Knee massacre, I 
expected to find some stereotypical terminology used to describe Indians, as well as a 
general tendency toward sensationalism by the newspapers when it came to describing 
the growing tension on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation. I certainly found stereotypical 
terminology used to describe the Indians but also found an even greater degree of 
sensationalism by the newspapers than I expected to find. I also found that the 
newspapers tended to criticize either military or government officials depending on the 
newspapers’ political bent and that few reporters interviewed Indians either before or 
after the massacre. 
Based on the literature that has been written about the Wounded Knee siege of 
1973 by non-Indian authors, I expected to find some Old West stereotyping by the 
newspapers I examined, as well as a tendency by reporters to glorify the Indian activists’ 
actions. I certainly found some stereotyping of Indians by newspapers but not as much as 
I expected, and I did find evidence of bias toward the Indian activists and against the 
government and tribal government officials opposed to the activists. I also found the 
newspapers covered the siege like they would a war with a strong focus on the weapons 
used and ammunition expended by both sides. Reporters interviewed both the Indian 
activists and government officials nearly in equal measure, except when the reporters 
were denied access to Wounded Knee. 
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As they flocked to the promise of conflict in the days before the Wounded Knee 
massacre in 1890, reporters swarmed the Pine Ridge Reservation again in 1973 when 
more than 200 Oglala Lakota and members of the American Indian Movement entered 
the village of Wounded Knee and declared their intentions to remain there until their 
concerns about government corruption were addressed. I expected the method and impact 
of the news reporters’ coverage of the 1890 and 1973 events to be very different. 
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Chapter I: The literature of Wounded Knee I and II 
The literature that has examined news coverage of the Wounded Knee massacre 
of 1890 has primarily come from historians such as Elmo Scott Watson, who wrote in a 
September 1943 article for Journalism Quarterly of “newspaper jingoism” and “yellow 
journalism” and how newspapers’ efforts to sell papers by sensationalizing tension on the 
Pine Ridge Reservation contributed to the conflict between soldiers and Indians. Later 
historians, including Dee Brown, author of “Bury My Heart at Wounded,” and William 
S.E. Coleman, author of “Voices of Wounded Knee,” have examined the broader origins 
and implications of the conflict, including news coverage as a mostly sideline issue that 
was not among the factors that caused the massacre. 
While much has been written about the Wounded Knee massacre, only in recent 
years has a focus on the contribution of news coverage to the conflict emerged among 
historians. However, at least one historian, Oliver Knight, author of “Following the 
Indian Wars,” wrote a chapter on news coverage of Wounded Knee in his 1953 book that 
described the state of newspaper coverage during the late 19th century as a competitive 
period marked by newspapers being willing to report sensational rumors in order to win 
wider readership. 
As late as the 1890s, most newspapers aligned themselves with and were funded 
by political parties, a practice that had begun after 1765, when conflict with England 
heated up, according to authors Michael Schudson and Susan E. Tifft, who wrote an 
essay on the state of journalism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries for the 2005 book 
“The Press.” 93 However, by the time the Civil War ended in 1865, newspapers had begun 
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to become profitable enterprises and began to compete with each other for readers 
through sensational news coverage rather than political pandering. 93  
When publisher William Randolph Hearst arrived in New York in 1895, he 
introduced comics, sensational news coverage and self-promotion to compete with New 
York World publisher Joseph Pulitzer. Both publishers called for war with Spain in the 
late 1890s. However, while some historians have blamed Hearst and Pulitzer for causing 
the Spanish-American War, Schudson and Tifft argued that contention is mostly the 
result of Hearst gleefully taking credit for the war. “The pull of dollars and the popularity 
of sensationalism helped move newspapers away from parties,” according to Schudson 
and Tifft. 93 Reporters who arrived at Wounded Knee in 1890 would bring with them this 
same inclination toward sensationalism. 
Later historical books, such as “Eyewitness at Wounded Knee” by Richard E. 
Jensen, R. Eli Paul and John E. Carter (1991) and “The Frontier Newspapers and the 
Coverage of the Plains Indian Wars” by Hugh J. Reilly (2010), have looked much more 
skeptically at the efforts of correspondents on the cold plains of South Dakota in 1890 
and 1891. Later historians, such as Watson and Rex Alan Smith, have demonstrated that 
the media contributed to the fear and paranoia felt by many settlers and government 
agents in the weeks and months leading up to the massacre through sensational news 
coverage that often relied on rumor and hearsay. That fear, in turn, led a nervous Indian 
agent to call military units to the reservation. 
As for the Wounded Knee siege of early 1973, the literature that has examined 
news coverage of that event has included magazine articles written during and shortly 
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after the event in publications such as “Harper’s Magazine” and “National Review” that 
lambasted the media for becoming focused on a staged “pseudo-event.”  
That literature also has included books written many years later by participants on 
both sides of the event, including American Indian Movement leaders Russell Means, 
who wrote “Where White Men Fear to Tread,” and Dennis Banks, author of “Ojibwa 
Warrior,” as well as Stanley David Lyman, former Pine Ridge, S.D., Bureau of Indian 
Affairs superintendent and author of “Wounded Knee: A Personal Account.” 
Historians also have examined news coverage of the siege, including Mary Ann 
Weston, author of “Native Americans in the News: Images of Indians in the Twentieth 
Century Press,” who found newspapers and magazine often relied on western stereotypes 
of cowboys and Indians in their coverage.  
Including the voices of Indian leaders distinguishes the literature that examines 
coverage of the 1973 siege from coverage of the 1890 massacre. Those Indian leaders 
have attempted to allay criticism of their alleged “handling” of the media during the siege 
and portray their endeavors in the most heroic light by denying they posed certain events 
and took hostages during the event.  
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Flocking to Wounded Knee 
By late 1890, the Indian Wars were drawing to a close. Custer had been whipped 
at the Little Bighorn, and the Lakota leaders who had been architects of his demise, 
Crazy Horse and Sitting Bull, were dead. Reporters came to document what was shaping 
up to be one last act of resistance by Lakota taking part in the Ghost Dance. 
Of the 21 reporters who came to the reservation, just three witnessed the actual 
massacre: William F. Kelley of the Nebraska State Journal, Charles W. Allen of the 
Chadron Democrat and Charles H. Cressey of the Omaha Daily Bee. Kelley, according to 
witnesses, took a much more direct role in the conflict, emptying his revolver at a warrior 
who charged him and then picking up a soldier’s rifle and killing at least two more 
Indians. 2  
The correspondents who flocked to the reservation were working in a period that 
historian Oliver Knight called “New Journalism,” a time he said was defined by 
newspapers struggling for circulation and competing aggressively for readers, often 
casting aside accuracy in favor of sensationalism. 3 
Characterizing the situation, Knight wrote: 
Unverified rumors became reports from reliable sources, idle gossip was reported 
as fact. As the distortion of an imminent Indian outbreak spread across the 
newspapers, terror in turn swept across Nebraska, the Dakotas and even as far east 
as Iowa. Mass hysteria sent settlers flocking into the nearest railroad towns, 
telling stories – made of whole cloth – about murder, scalping and desolation. 3 
 
In all, 21 correspondents – more than had covered all of the other Indian War 
campaigns before then – gathered at Pine Ridge, S.D., from as far away as Washington, 
D.C., and as near as Chadron – 30 miles away – to tell the story of the final clash between 
the U.S. Army and “red savages.” 3 Their dispatches made it clear that the Ghost Dance 
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signaled the beginning of yet another Indian uprising, despite credible claims from the 
Indians and other witnesses to the dancing who said it was a non-violent, if misguided, 
attempt to revive the dying culture of the plains tribes. 2 
Historian Coleman described many instances of inaccuracy and exaggeration on 
the part of reporters at Wounded Knee. He described conflicting dispatches sent from the 
reservation and nearby communities, including alarmist reports of “roving bands of 
Sioux” by the Rapid City Journal on Nov. 23, 1890. 4 Only a day later, the Omaha Daily 
Bee quoted Bishop Hare of the Episcopal church, who had done missionary work among 
the Lakota for nearly a decade, as saying the Ghost Dance would run its course if allowed 
to continue uninterrupted. If the military intervened in the dance, however, “It will 
precipitate war with absolute certainty,” Hare warned. 4 
Several historians, including Watson and Coleman, described how newspapers 
closer to the reservation called for calm in the face of sensational reports by regional and 
national media about growing tension. The Custer Chronicle of South Dakota 
complained: “The Indian scare continues unabated, having been intensified rather than 
diminished by the startling and (in) many instances highly exaggerated reports emanating 
from newspaper correspondents at the front who seem inclined to report the situation in 
its most alarming possible phrase.” 4 Residents of Chadron, less than 30 miles from Pine 
Ridge, got so fed up with the alarmist news reports that they circulated a petition 
demanding the Daily Bee and the World-Herald stop printing such “incredible and 
provocative reports.” 5 
Some historians, including Rex Alan Smith, have gone so far as to call their 
sensational coverage a contributing factor to the massacre. 6 That coverage could be seen 
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in such alarmist front page headlines as: “THE TURBULENT REDS, Latest Intelligence 
from the Scene of the Threatened Outbreak” (Omaha Daily Bee, Nov. 22, 1890) and 
“Squaws Swarming at Pine Ridge, Each One Armed With a Knife” (Daily Bee, Dec. 17, 
1890). But once the shooting had ended, those same reporters began to blame the same 
soldiers and government agents they had earlier described as valiant defenders of the 
plains. The “treacherous red devils” and “murderous savages,” as they had called the 
Indians prior to the massacre, then became the hapless victims of an uncaring and 
bloodthirsty government and military war machine that had starved them and then 
slaughtered them. 2 
While Watson pulls no punches when it comes to criticizing press coverage, he 
lays most of the blame for the massacre on the “timorous and inept agent at Pine Ridge,” 
Dr. D.F. Royer. He describes Royer as a political appointee who lacked the skills to 
handle explosive situations. “Royer played into the hands of these volunteer 
propagandists by bombarding his superiors in Washington with requests that troops be 
sent to Pine Ridge.” 2 
Historians Richard E. Jensen, R. Eli Paul and John E. Carter took a different 
approach to examining news coverage of Wounded Knee, focusing on the images 
produced by the photographers there. Their book, “Eyewitness at Wounded Knee,” 
examines the personal histories of those photographers, as well as the quality of their 
work and their motivations, which primarily consisted of profit. In 1890, selling photos of 
the dying Plains Indian culture was lucrative, especially when the photos illustrated 
conflict. As a result, the photographers who captured images of “people frozen in death, 
on a land frozen by cold” made their photos not as documents attesting to the Indians’ 
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decline but as a means to “feed the news-hungry public.” 5 In their efforts to give their 
viewers what they wanted – images of savage Indians fighting for their way of life – 
“Fact became subordinate to stereotype.” 5 
In addition, the reporters who arrived at Chadron and other communities near the 
reservation in late 1890 colored their dispatches to “conform to the political affiliations of 
the journals they represented.” 2 The Democratic newspapers saw the rising tension as the 
result of the corrupt and inefficient administration of Indian affairs under Republican 
President Benjamin Harrison. Republican newspapers viewed the potential uprising as 
the result of the failed Indian policies of former Democratic President Grover Cleveland. 
2 That politically tinted coverage could be seen most clearly in the two most prominent 
newspapers in Omaha, Neb. – the Republican-leaning Omaha Daily Bee and the 
Democratic-leaning Omaha World-Herald. While the Daily Bee heralded the efforts of 
Indian agent Royer, even deflecting criticism of Royer from the World-Herald, the 
World-Herald made it clear that nearly all of the blame for the impending violence rested 
with Royer and the inept government officials at Pine Ridge. 9 The World-Herald, 
meanwhile, glorified the military’s efforts and called for military leaders to take control 
of the reservation’s affairs. 9 
Perhaps the most eloquent of those voices calling for military control of Pine 
Ridge was Suzette La Flesche, one of the nation’s first female Indian reporters. An 
Omaha tribal member, she became an advocate for the Indians at Pine Ridge and 
appealed on their behalf for military commanders to replace Interior Department 
leadership at the reservation. 
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“I am the only Indian speaking to the public through the press for the Indians, and 
I demand in the name of the race and for their welfare that it shall be done,” she wrote. 
La Flesche’s presence at Wounded Knee would presage the eventual creation of 
Indian media and the evolution of Indian activism that would seek greater control of news 
coverage during the turbulent 1960s and 1970s. 
14 
A Return to Wounded Knee 
In February 1973 – drawn by images of Indians hoisting rifles and shaking their 
fists – the national media fixated quickly on the looming violence as hundreds of FBI 
agents and U.S. marshals surrounded the lightly armed Wounded Knee occupiers with 
tanks and armored personnel carriers. The scene echoed that other great conflict that had 
scarred this land, that day in 1890 when shots rang out near a creek named Wounded 
Knee. 
“It virtually guaranteed them a good press,” reporter Terri Schultz noted cynically 
when commenting on the activists’ choice of ground in a June 1973 article in Harper’s 
Magazine. 11 
A March 1973 article in Time described how the stunning images coming from 
Wounded Knee created a kind of trap for the media, especially TV news stations, which 
were lured to the reservation and then forced to remain there throughout much of the 71-
day siege. 12 Time quoted Interior Department Aide Charles Soller as saying: “It could 
have been settled in a week if it weren’t for this horde (of reporters).” Newsmen watched 
“helplessly as the thin line between covering and creating news wavered,” according to 
the Time article, “Trap at Wounded Knee.” 12 
Whether already aware of Wounded Knee’s history or reminded by the Indian 
activists surrounded there, newspaper, television and radio reporters took every possible 
opportunity to compare the two conflicts. Their coverage, at least at first, focused on the 
romantic noble warrior fighting valiantly against an oppressive, powerful government. 13 
But the government’s decision to enforce the blockade around Wounded Knee severely 
limited press access and curtailed the occupiers’ efforts to get their message to the outside 
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world. 13 Thus, the media grew tired of the lack of stunning images and engaging 
interviews with activists and began to contemplate what drew them to Wounded Knee in 
the first place. 
Headlines like “Bamboozle Me Not at Wounded Knee,” “Trap at Wounded Knee” 
and “Of Fallen Trees and Wounded Knees” reflected a growing skepticism by the 
national media over the occupiers’ theatrics. The Chicago Tribune described the Indians 
as militant criminals, though The New York Times called them “rebels” and urged 
patience by the government. 13 Some reporters called the action at Wounded Knee make-
believe, thus allowing their readers to view the issues as fictional. 13 And few, if any, 
reporters actually investigated the charges made by the occupiers against Oglala Sioux 
Chairman Dick Wilson, whom the activists described as a criminal who had killed 
without provocation many traditional Lakota and embezzled from his tribe. 13  
However, the occupiers failed to adequately communicate to the American public 
the vast, complex changes in Indian policy they sought, a failure that hurt their cause, 
according to some historians. 14 Schultz of Harper’s described the conflict between 
Wilson and the activists as “not all that complicated,” as basically a struggle between a 
power-hungry tribal chairman and a bunch of alcoholic, equally power-hungry 
militants.11 
Those reporters who arrived at or near Wounded Knee covered the event as they 
would a war, describing in great detail the arms that both sides used and the daily tit-for-
tat between the two sides. 13 Too often, their coverage lacked context, both cultural and 
historical. Reporters routinely evoked western images of cowboys and Indians dueling on 
the plains. 13  
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The Indians reinforced those stereotypes, according to some magazine writers at 
the time. “They dress and act as if they believe everything the white man has written 
about them,” Schultz wrote for Harper’s. 11 She described activists directing cameramen 
and restaging events that reporters missed, as well as parading before the media 
“hostages” who later turned out to be willing participants in the occupation. 11 Writing for 
the National Review in April 1973, author Victor Gold described a young Indian man 
guarding a roadblock who had to be reminded that he didn’t look very warlike with “an 
expensive camera dangling next to his rifle. So he put the camera aside as he posed as a 
warrior for a photograph.” 16  
Gold assailed the Native American activists’ handling of media as a desperate 
attempt to revive a dying form of political theatre. “It is like watching the Dead End Kids 
after they became the East Side Kids; a performance of ‘Streetcar’ with Jon Voight 
playing the old Brando role; or a rendition of the new Brando non-accepting an Oscar 
with Sandra Dee standing in for Sacheen Littlefeather,” Gold wrote. 16 “What’s left to 
watch is only the final, banal exercise of an overexposed political art form.” 
In reality, Schultz wrote, the activists were anything but real Indians. Instead, they 
were urban Indians who knew little about their traditional cultures and, by and large, 
couldn’t speak their Native American languages. She lampooned the activists’ inability to 
put up a tipi or shoot and kill a cow to eat. 11  
Still, others blamed stereotypical depiction of Indians in film and the 
government’s neglect of tribes for their deplorable conditions. When a young Indian 
woman named Sacheen Littlefeather stepped up to the microphone at the March 1973 
Oscars, she informed those in the audience and those watching from home that Marlon 
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Brando would not be accepting the award for best actor for his role in “The Godfather” 
because of how badly the government and the media had treated Indians. 92 “He very 
regretfully cannot accept this very generous award, and the reasons for this being are the 
treatment of American Indians today by the film industry, excuse me, and on television in 
movie re-runs and also with recent happenings at Wounded Knee.” 91 Brando, through 
Littlefeather, expressed support for the activists at Wounded Knee. 
Schultz and many other reporters at the time, however, lapsed into more modern 
stereotypes of Indians as drunks and impoverished. Schultz described how militants and 
tribal chairman Wilson’s family drank heavily as they were being interviewed. 11 She 
then described one of the lead activists as a poor man with bad teeth and a Napoleon 
complex. Schultz wrote: “Standing in the rubble behind his house the next morning, feet 
spread, arms crossed, the four remaining teeth in his mouth gleaming in the sun, Aaron 
DeSersa tells a group of reporters: ‘I have ordered the caravans to come from St. Louis, 
Des Moines, St. Paul and Oklahoma, to avenge the firebombing of my house by Wilson’s 
goon squads.’” 11  
Schultz pointed out that a state fire marshal later determined that faulty wiring 
caused the fire in DeSersa’s home, not a firebomb. But Schultz wasn’t alone in her 
demeaning descriptions of Indians. The Chicago Daily News described how many 
reservation residents “don’t seem to mind” being poor, thus portraying Indians as a 
degraded people content with conditions that others would find intolerable. 13 At the same 
time, local media largely focused their coverage on interviews with government officials 
and non-Indians who expressed fear of spreading violence by militants. Schultz 
interviewed James Kuehn, longtime executive editor of the Rapid City Journal, who told 
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her: “We’re so close to the situation and things are so tense, you can’t say anything about 
the Indians without offending somebody.” 11 
Historian Weston described the 1960s and 1970s as a period of American 
journalism marked by a sea change in coverage of Indians. Unlike in 1890 and 1891, 
when just one Indian reporter, Suzette La Flesche, could be found to speak on behalf of 
the Indians killed at Wounded Knee, a century later, Indians had established their own 
media and had access to mainstream media. 13 They could call on such Native American 
intellectuals as author Vine Deloria and Mohawk activist Richard Oakes to speak for 
them in such hallowed pages as The New York Times Magazine. 13  
Indians had become their own spokespeople and exercised influence on the 
highest levels of government. They also could, and did, write their own version of the 
occupation’s history. Activists like Russell Means, Dennis Banks and “Lakota Woman” 
author Mary Crow Dog painted their own portraits of the events of early 1973. This was a 
far different Indian than the one the Seventh Cavalry encountered and destroyed at 
Wounded Knee in 1890. Rather than sit mute as their ancestors did when the media told 
the story of the 1890 massacre, these Indians would attempt to rewrite history, to explain 
their actions themselves – without media like newspapers, radio or television. 
In his autobiography, “Ojibwa Warrior,” Banks attempted to portray the takeover 
as approved by traditional Native Americans, an assertion no doubt meant to counter 
criticism that the occupiers were mostly urban, non-reservation Indians. 17 He also 
attempts to explain that the activists never meant to portray the farmers and store owners 
held at Wounded Knee as hostages, despite numerous press reports and video footage that 
showed the activists herding the men and women around with their hands tied. Banks 
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said the media helped prevent greater violence at Wounded Knee. “We were thankful for 
their attention. As long as the press were there, we could not be attacked.” 17 
In his autobiography, “Where White Men Fear to Tread,” Russell Means also 
addressed the question of the “hostages.” “All around the country, the headline news was 
that a bunch of savages – radical, militant Indians – was holding white hostages.” 18 On 
the contrary, like Banks, he argued the hostages were willing participants, a fact that the 
activists never meant to portray otherwise, Means said.  
Means was more forthcoming about the activists’ handling of the media than 
Banks, however, and described how the occupiers used the media to trick the government 
into thinking they had heavy weapons that could pierce an armored personnel carrier. 18 
He also poked fun at cameramen who too often focused on the pageantry of Indian 
religious ceremonies, including a morning prayer ceremony held at the Wounded Knee 
gravesite that always drew reporters’ attention. 18 But Means betrayed the activists’ and 
his own infatuation with their temporary celebrity, writing in great detail about getting to 
dine with celebrity media figures like CBS producer Phil O’Connor and NBC 
correspondent Fred Briggs. 18 
However, Indians who occupied Wounded Knee weren’t the only participants in 
the siege who wrote their versions of the events there. Government officials and tribal 
leaders who opposed the activists also have written personal accounts of the siege. 
Among them is Stanley David Lyman, who served as the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
superintendent in Pine Ridge in 1973. In his autobiography, “Wounded Knee: A Personal 
Account,” Lyman described the efforts of government officials as well intentioned 
though frustrated by the illegal actions of the activists. He criticized press coverage of the 
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siege as largely inaccurate and biased toward the activists. He described at length an 
ABC News piece that erroneously described all the businesses in Pine Ridge as being 
owned by non-Indians. 19 He also described the government’s efforts to get the media to 
focus on the other side of the story, including the plight of displaced Wounded Knee 
residents. But the media, according to Lyman, didn’t seem to want to get anyone but the 
activists’ version of events. “After a time, I felt that the press was no longer listening to 
these people,” he said of a press conference the government organized featuring 
displaced Wounded Knee residents. “(The press) stopped taking notes, and it seemed like 
nothing was going to be accomplished.” 19 
However, even Lyman conceded the activists had some cause for their actions. He 
described how he failed at first to understand why the activists had taken over Wounded 
Knee. However, after listening to the impassioned plea of a tribal council member who 
shared the activists’ beliefs that tribal government needed to change, Lyman began to feel 
disillusioned about his cause. “As he talked I realized that this man has known for a long 
time what I have come to know only in the last few months: that tribal government is an 
overlay, it does not reach the people.” 19 
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An evolving Indian voice 
By the time Native American activists took over the small village of Wounded 
Knee on the impoverished Pine Ridge Indian Reservation of South Dakota in February 
1973, American media had evolved into a many-tentacled beast. Not only did newspaper 
reporters arrive at Wounded Knee to cover the takeover, as they had to cover growing 
tension on the reservation in 1890, television and radio reporters also arrived with their 
cameras and voice recorders. America would learn about the events taking place in a 
forgotten, windswept corner of South Dakota on their television sets and in their cars, as 
well as in their newspapers. But while the media had evolved technologically, it remained 
tethered to a news-hungry public that enjoyed the sounds and images of Indian activists 
opposing the government. As a result, much as it did in 1890 and 1891, the media proved 
vulnerable to sensationalism and relied on old stereotypes when it came to covering the 
second Wounded Knee conflict. 
A major difference between news coverage of both events, however, was the 
inclusion of Native American voices within the media coverage of Wounded Knee 1973. 
This time, Indians wouldn’t watch helplessly as white photographers and correspondents 
told their story of government betrayal and neglect. They would help shape coverage of 
the events and write their own versions of history, and like the non-Indian reporters of 
1890 and 1891, their stories would be an imperfect mix of truth, lies and exaggerations. 
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Chapter II: Wounded Knee 1890 
The two reporters – one an Indian, the other her husband and a friend to the 
Indians – handed the old woman a tin cup full of water to give to the little girl whose 
pleas for mni, mni (Lakota for water) were the only sounds in the church full of wounded 
and dying Indians. As the woman poured the water into the girl’s mouth, water seeped 
from a gash in the girl’s throat. A banner hanging above the room read: “Peace on earth, 
good will to men.” 20 
Suzette La Flesche, an Omaha tribal member and reporter for the Omaha World-
Herald covering the unfolding 1890 Wounded Knee Massacre, wrote of the scene: “I 
have been thus particular in giving horrible details in the hope of rousing such an 
indignation that another such causeless war shall never again be allowed by the people of 
the United States.” 21 
Many years later, her husband, Thomas H. Tibbles, a reporter for the World-
Herald who also covered the massacre, would say of the tragedy: “Nothing I have seen in 
my whole varied life has ever affected or depressed or haunted me like the scenes I saw 
that night in that church, under the festival decorations of the Prince of Peace, which 
hung above the rows of suffering, innocent women and children.” 20 
23 
Going to War 
As the Indian Wars drew to a close on the Great Plains, the newspapers of 
Nebraska and the East Coast dispatched their reporters to the Pine Ridge Agency of 
South Dakota and its nearby white communities to document the last days of Indian 
resistance. As those correspondents began wiring their stories, the nation and the world 
became ever aware of a growing tension on the reservation, where Indian “bucks” and 
“squaws” engaged in the Ghost Dance, which correspondents described as a last 
desperate attempt to return to the old ways and wash their land of invaders. Those 
correspondents would go so far as to say the Ghost Dance signaled the start of a major 
uprising among the Sioux and, perhaps, other tribes of the Great Plains who would join 
them in that fight. 
However, among the Sioux, the Ghost Dance was never meant to start the 
massive uprising so feared by some settlers and trumpeted by nearly all of the 
correspondents. Rather, the dance was a final desperate attempt to revive the dying 
culture of the plains tribes, mixed with a certain religious fever akin to religious revivals 
that have swept white America at various times throughout its history. 9 
In his posthumously published 1957 memoir, Tibbles described arriving with La 
Flesche at the Pine Ridge Agency to find “war correspondents” from all over the country 
already there to produce “thrilling ‘war news.’” 20 Many were all too happy to write 
stories of Indian skirmishes, battles and outbreaks that had never occurred, according to 
Tibbles. 20 They wrote of Indians firing burning arrows into agency buildings and 
attacking settlers and soldiers alike.  
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But, there at the agency, Tibbles and La Flesche saw a much different scene than 
that portrayed by writers from the eastern U.S. and elsewhere in Nebraska. Tibbles and 
La Flesche saw Indian children and adults going to church and school and shopping at the 
trader’s store, going about their normal lives. 20 Tibbles and La Flesche attempted to allay 
their readers’ fears by dispelling rumors and granting little weight to unconfirmed 
reports. 20 However, even Tibbles and La Flesche were buffeted by the prevailing 
journalistic winds of the day. Tibbles described his own newspaper, as well as the 
Chicago Express, which was publishing the World-Herald’s stories from Pine Ridge, as 
pushing him and La Flesche to write more sensational stories. 20 Their newspaper 
eventually ordered them home for failing to produce such gripping stories as were filling 
the pages of their competitors. 
Our newspapers had grown indignant with us for not turning in anything 
interesting about this “great Indian war” all around us. Other dailies had whole 
columns of thrilling stuff, but our readers, finding not exciting “news from the 
front,” flung their papers down in disgust. 20 
 
Only a personal appeal from Gen. Nelson Miles, the division commander at the 
agency, convinced the World-Herald editors to allow La Flesche and Tibbles to remain at 
Pine Ridge. 20 In an appeal on the Indians’ behalf, La Flesche, writing under her Omaha 
name, Bright Eyes, asked that Gen. Miles’ request that military commanders replace 
Interior Department administrators be acted upon. 
“I am the only Indian speaking to the public through the press for the Indians, and 
I demand in the name of the race and for their welfare that it shall be done,” she wrote. 10 
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Feeding the Fear 
“THE TURBULENT REDS, Latest Intelligence from the Scene of the Threatened 
Outbreak.” 7 
“Squaws Swarming at Pine Ridge, Each One Armed With a Knife.” 8 
“A Vicious Indian, He Makes a Resolute Attempt to Secure a Young Lady’s 
Scalp.” 22 
These were all typical Omaha Daily Bee headlines leading up to the massacre. By 
comparison, the World-Herald portrayed the troubles on the reservation as caused by 
government negligence of the Indians and by the lack of adequate food and supplies to 
the Indians. The newspaper cited the Indian bureau’s decision to cut the Indians’ beef 
rations by 1 million pounds per year. “Before their rations were cut at all, they were half 
starved.” 23  
“THEY DON’T KNOW THE INJUN, The Heads of the Government Wofully 
(sic) Ignorant Concerning the Nation’s Ward” 24 and “Agent Royer’s Lack of Experience 
and Nerve Was Responsible for All the Scare That Existed” 25 were typical World-Herald 
headlines that sought to lay the blame squarely on the soldiers of the politically appointed 
government agents at Pine Ridge. At the same time, the World-Herald also sought to 
allay fears of settlers and readers with headlines like “AFFAIRS AT PINE RIDGE, A 
Plain Statement of Facts as They Now Exist at the Agency” 25 and “NO RAIDS 
REPORTED, The Army Knows Nothing of Indian Depredations.” 26 
According to historian Reilly, newspapers covering the Indian Wars rarely 
understood the Indians’ perspective. However, they often attempted to defend Indian 
interests by criticizing the government for failing to live up to its promises to the Indians, 
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a view that often corresponded with military opinions about civilian administration of the 
reservations. 9 
As has been shown, however, newspapers’ motives for criticizing government 
officials were likely tainted by their own political viewpoint and allegiances. The World-
Herald – a Democratic leaning newspaper prone to criticize the Republican 
administration of Benjamin Harrison 9 – proved especially harsh in its criticism of Pine 
Ridge Agent Daniel F. Royer’s decision to request military assistance to quell the Ghost 
Dance after his own Indian police were rebuffed by armed dancers when they attempted 
to stop the dancing. Reporter Carl Smith began what would be a long tirade against Royer 
by quoting former Pine Ridge Agent Valentine T. McGillicuddy, who described Indian 
agents generally as political appointees who lack experience in dealing with Indians. 
Asked by Smith what he considered to be the cause of the troubles at Pine Ridge, 
McGillicuddy responded: “The disorganized condition of the affairs of the agency when 
Mr. Royer took charge is the foundation, I take it. Together with this was the Messiah 
craze.” 24 
In a story published three days later, Smith described how, upon first reaching the 
agency, he had found Royer absent from his post. 25 The reporter described finding a 
clearly frightened and paranoid Royer feverishly writing dispatches to the military in 
Rushville, several miles from Pine Ridge. Royer, Smith said, told him he feared his 
dispatches might be intercepted by Indians and that he wouldn’t return to the agency until 
the troops arrived at Rushville to accompany him there. 25 Smith said Royer had 
threatened to have him removed from the agency if he continued writing stories 
criticizing him. The World-Herald reporter then implied that Royer had mistakenly called 
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the military to the reservation. Smith wrote that Royer was too quick to discredit any 
accounts of the situation at Pine Ridge that didn’t support his decision to call upon the 
military. 
“After a time it became apparent to me and to every army officer in the post – and 
most are old Indian fighters – that Mr. Royer was trying to substantiate the fright which 
had caused him to call upon the troops.” 25 Then, Smith offered his assessment of Royer 
even more plainly: “I do not wish to do anybody up there an injustice, but there is not a 
circumstance which points to anything but a weak backbone, a vacillating spirit and I 
may say from my own experience, a principle which would not cause him to hesitate to 
lie to a white man, to say nothing of an Indian.” 25 Royer eventually succeeded in getting 
the World-Herald to recall Smith. However, in perhaps a further slap at Royer, the 
newspaper sent in Smith’s place two well-known Indian advocates: La Flesche and 
Tibbles. 9 
Even as the World-Herald criticized government officials for providing adequate 
supplies to the Indians, other newspapers defended government treatment of Indians and 
reaction to the Ghost Dance. The Omaha Daily Bee staked its position as defender of the 
government agents by calling the World-Herald’s claim that Royer had abandoned his 
post at Pine Ridge out of fear “utterly false.” The newspaper’s correspondent at Pine 
Ridge, Charles H. Cressey, went on to explain that Royer had traveled to Rushville to 
greet Gen. John Rutter Brooke there and provide him with vital information regarding the 
situation at the agency before the general proceeded to Pine Ridge. 7 “Agent Royer 
deserves only the very highest praise for his conduct ever since he has been here and 
particularly in connection with the trying situation of affairs now on.” 7  
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The Omaha Daily Bee wasn’t alone in its defense of the embattled agents at Pine 
Ridge. The Daily Critic in Washington, D.C., reported the contents of a letter from 
Census Indian Agent Jesse Lee at Pine Ridge read by U.S. Sen. Henry L. Dawes of 
Massachusetts on the Senate floor:  
Mr. Dawes expresses his conviction that the Government had substantially 
fulfilled its entire obligations to those Indians, and he referred to the report in this 
morning’s papers of the parley between General Brooke and the Sioux chiefs, in 
which the latter made the request to have teams sent to the Bad Lands to bring in 
“the great quantities of beef” which they had there. This did not show that they 
were starving. 28 
 
Early in its reporting from Pine Ridge, the Omaha Daily Bee made clear its 
position on the inevitability of conflict between the “redskins” and the military. With no 
confirmed battles or even skirmishes to write about when he first arrived at the agency, 
Cressey offered this foreboding description of the situation at Pine Ridge in early 
December: “The dawn of another day has come and mercifully without bloodshed in our 
midst.” 7 To the Omaha Daily Bee, peace on the reservation was only the calm before the 
storm, and Royer’s decision to request military assistance was prudent. “The best 
judgment of those high in command is that the dancers will fight to the death rather than 
submit.” 7  
However, an account by two Omaha citizens who said they had witnessed the 
Ghost Dance and that was published in the Omaha Daily Bee seemed to contradict the 
newspaper’s position supporting Royer’s decision to call upon the military to pacify the 
Ghost Dancers. The two Omaha men said there was “nothing of a warlike nature” in the 
Indians’ dance and that it appeared to be only “wild religious fanaticism.” 29 However, 
according to the two Omaha men, the underlying principles of the dance combined with 
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the “well known disposition of the Indians” could result in serious trouble if the ghost 
dancing was allowed to continue, a position that offered further support for Royer’s 
actions. 29 
Just beyond the tempestuous confines of Omaha’s journalistic community, the 
Lincoln Evening News attempted to both calm and alarm its readers, often in the same 
edition. Under the headline “THE INDIAN SCARE,” a subheadline in the Lincoln 
Evening News read: “The Reported Battle at Fort Keogh a Fake.” 30 The story went on to 
say: “A dispatch received by The United Press from General Manager Mellen of the 
Northern Pacific railroad said the report from Missoula, Mont., of fighting between the 
Indians and soldiers is absolutely without foundation.” 30 In the same story, however, the 
newspaper recounted an unlikely tale told to the newspaper’s correspondent in Pine 
Ridge by two Indian policemen who said their families had been abducted by hostile 
Indians and taken to the Badlands. The Indian policemen said the hostile Indians told 
them: “‘Go and tell the soldiers at Pine Ridge agency we are a part of the 1,300 other 
Rosebud Indians now near Pine Ridge agency, and that from now on we are going to kill 
every white person we meet, and if the soldiers come we are ready for them.’” 30  
Later coverage by the Lincoln Evening News continued to vacillate between fear-
mongering and rumor-dispelling. “A son of a prominent army official is at headquarters 
and said, ‘It is more of a correspondents’ than an Indian scare,’” said a wire report 
published in the newspaper. 31 The newspaper also quoted McGillicuddy as contradicting 
newspaper reports of unrest at Pine Ridge. 32  
Like other newspapers at the time, the Lincoln newspaper described Hunkpapa 
leader Sitting Bull as one of the chief instigators of the Ghost Dance who was openly 
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defying the military’s efforts to stop the dance. The newspaper also imitated its peers in 
giving rise to fears of other tribes joining the hostile Sioux encamped in the Badlands. 
“Gen. Brooke has just received a telegram from Gen. Ruger, warning him that three 
hundred lodges (about one thousand warriors) of Cheyennes were coming from the 
Cheyenne agency to join the hostiles near here,” the newspaper wrote in a typical report 
of rumored alliances that never materialized between the Sioux at Pine Ridge and other 
tribes. 33 An especially inflammatory story claimed that warriors from four Sioux 
reservations – Standing Rock, Cheyenne River, Lower Brule and Rosebud – were 
“sweeping across the country, fully armed, toward the bad lands to join the rebel reds 
now there. This will swell the hostile force to over four thousand.” 34 This “army of reds” 
was supposedly committing all manner of depredations as it “stampeded” across the 
country, destroying cabins and livestock of friendly Indians in their path. 34 
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Death of a Chief 
The first significant event for the reporters at Pine Ridge to write about came Dec. 
15, 1890, when Indian police acting on orders of the agent at Standing Rock killed Sitting 
Bull. While most of the Nebraska newspapers relied on wire reports, which offered fairly 
accurate if rather sparse information about the event, those reporters at Pine Ridge seized 
on the opportunity to predict hostility on the part of the Sioux there as a result of Sitting 
Bull’s killing in North Dakota. 
Having painted Sitting Bull as one of the primary agitators and Ghost Dance 
supporters, the Nebraska newspapers now predicted an abatement of hostilities at Pine 
Ridge as a result of his death. “Sitting Bull was able to keep the young bucks excited with 
the Messiah craze, but now that he is dead Colonel Corbin believes hostilities will soon 
stop,” the Omaha Daily Bee predicted. 27 The Lincoln Evening News reassured its 
readers a general outbreak on the Sioux reservation was unlikely following Sitting Bull’s 
death because the reservation was surrounded by troops. “It is expected that before 
another sun has set Sitting Bull’s celebrated chorus of dancers will be good Indians or 
prisoners,” the newspaper reported, referencing Gen. Phillip Sheridan’s infamous phrase, 
“The only good Indians I ever saw were dead.” (His quote later was truncated to the more 
popular, “The only good Indian is a dead Indian.”) 35 And while the newspaper predicted 
a “lively time” once the Indians at Pine Ridge heard about Sitting Bull’s death, the 
Lincoln Evening News also ran a wire story quoting a Sioux man living near Bad River 
in South Dakota who said the Indians living in that part of the state were glad to hear of 
Sitting Bull’s death. 36  
32 
Initially, the World-Herald also predicted the old chief’s death would not ignite 
further conflict at Pine Ridge. However, as tensions mounted between the Indians at Pine 
Ridge and the growing number of cavalry and infantry arriving at the agency and as 
troubling rumors swirled, La Flesche again tried to calm fears and offer possible 
solutions: “I think this affair could be more easily settled if Governor (John Milton) 
Thayer (of Nebraska) would keep off the cowboys and militia, and something could be 
done to stop the lies that are sent to the papers about fights that never occurred. I am sure 
that the military are able to cope with the situation.” 37 
The World-Herald’s decision to send La Flesche and Tibbles – who had both 
gained fame 11 years before Wounded Knee for successfully advocating on behalf of 
Ponca Chief Standing Bear before an Omaha judge who was considering whether to 
allow the chief to return to his homelands along the Niobrara – led to something 
unprecedented in the coverage of the Indian Wars: interviews with Indians. 9 La Flesche 
and Tibbles even stayed in an Indian family’s home upon arriving at Pine Ridge in order 
to try to more effectively get interviews and intelligence from the Indians. 20 That 
decision provided them the means to dispel baseless rumors about battles and Indian 
depredations being reported by other newspapers.  
Under the headline “WITHOUT FOUNDATION, Rumored Stories Sent From 
Pine Ridge Are Untrue,” Tibbles wrote of such rumors that were being reported in other 
newspapers shortly after arriving at Pine Ridge. “I understand that long specials have 
been sent to eastern papers of a most sensational kind. There is not a word of truth in 
them. There has been no fight and no bloodshed.” 38 Unfortunately, the two reporters’ 
efforts to quell unease about the problems at Pine Ridge would have little impact on 
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newspaper coverage and would prove unsuccessful at stopping the coming battle as Big 
Foot’s cold and weary band of Sioux approached the agency and the Seventh Cavalry 
rode out to meet them. 
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Reporters on the Frontlines 
According to historian Dee Brown, the promise of a return to the old ways 
through the Ghost Dance was the only reason the angered and grieving Sioux did not rise 
up against the army after Sitting Bull’s death. 39 However, the now leaderless Hunkpapas 
from Standing Rock decided they were no longer safe without Sitting Bull, and many 
began a long trek south toward Pine Ridge seeking safety with Red Cloud. Nearly 100 of 
those fleeing Hunkpapas eventually caught up with Big Foot’s camp of Miniconjou near 
Cherry Creek. That same day, the War Department ordered the arrest of Big Foot, a 
leader the department considered high on its list of “fomenters of disturbance.” 39 
And so the Seventh Cavalry rode out from Pine Ridge to meet Big Foot. With 
Maj. Samuel Whitside leading them, the Seventh Cavalry caught Big Foot’s band on the 
afternoon of Dec. 28, 1890. That night, the column of cavalry and Indian prisoners made 
camp at Wounded Knee Creek, and Whitside deployed his soldiers all around the Indians 
and placed his two Hotchkiss guns on a low hill just north of the Indian camp. 6 It wasn’t 
long before the Seventh Cavalry’s commanding officer, Col. James W. Forsyth, arrived 
from the agency with the regiment’s four remaining troops and two more Hotchkiss guns. 
He carried with him orders from Gen. Miles that read: “Disarm the Indians. Take every 
precaution to prevent their escape. If they choose to fight, destroy them.” 6 
According to Whitside’s count, 350 Indians made up Big Foot’s band, including 
230 women and children. The soldiers numbered nearly 500. At 7 a.m. Dec. 29, 1890, a 
trumpeter called the soldiers to order, and Forsyth issued his commands to surround the 
Indians and begin disarming them. 6 Around 7:30 a.m., the Indians began to gather 
around the ailing Big Foot’s tent, as Tibbles wandered up to the gun battery on what 
35 
would become known as Cemetery Hill and overhead Lt. Harry Hawthorne comment to 
his commanding officer, Capt. Charles Ilsley: “Isn’t this rather a strange formation of 
troops, if there should be any trouble?” To which, Ilsley responded: “There’s no 
possibility of trouble that I can see. Big Foot wants to go to the agency and we’re a guard 
of honor to escort him in.” 20 But Tibbles wrote later that he realized immediately what 
Hawthorne meant: “If any troop should try to shoot any Indian, it must fire straight in the 
direction of some other army group stationed in that enclosing square.” 20 The 
lieutenant’s observation would later haunt Forsyth, who endured a court-martial after 
several of his soldiers died from friendly fire as a result of the ill-planned formations he 
ordered that morning. 6 
After a brief speech, Forsyth ordered Big Foot’s people to give up their guns, 
which immediately caused a commotion among the men, who feared the soldiers might 
take their guns and then shoot them. After conferring with Big Foot, the Indians decided 
only to hand over two broken and useless guns and keep their good guns. 6 But Forsyth 
and Whitside knew the Indians had better guns and insisted they hand them over. After 
the Indians refused, the officers ordered their men to begin searching the camp. The 
soldiers found several pristine Winchester repeating rifles on the bodies of women, and as 
they began confiscating anything that could be considered a weapon, including hunting 
knives and other utensils, the Indian men grew ever more restless. Finally, a medicine 
man, Yellow Bird, stretched his arm toward the sky and prayed that his people’s ghost 
shirts would stop the soldiers’ bullets. 6 He began dancing and chanting, then threw a 
fistful of dust into the air before turning to face the Indian men:  
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Do not be afraid! Let your hearts be strong to meet what is before you! There are 
lots of soldiers and they have lots of bullets, but the prairie is large and the bullets 
will not go toward you, but over the large prairies. … As you saw me throw up 
the dust and it floated away, so will the bullets float harmlessly away over the 
prairie. 6 
 
What happened next is the subject of much controversy, and it is difficult to 
criticize journalists or historians for their presentation of the outbreak of violence. 
According to historian Smith, a young Indian man named either Black Coyote or Hosi 
Yanka, which means “deaf,” who was deaf and whom most described later as a 
troublemaker, stood up, held his Winchester above his head and began shouting that the 
rifle was his and he would not give it up. 6 Yellow Bird, meanwhile, continued chanting.  
Two sergeants, who had been sneaking up behind Black Coyote (or Hosi Yanka), 
grabbed him from behind. As they did, the rifle in the youth’s hands pointed skyward and 
went off. Just then, a half dozen young Indians threw off their blankets and aimed their 
Winchesters at the soldiers. 6 A bullet tore through Capt. George Wallace’s head, and 
another ripped through Big Foot’s skull. An Indian plunged a knife into Father Francis 
Craft’s back as he attempted to care for the wounded. 6 Soon, the entire camp disappeared 
into a cloud of powder smoke as the soldiers fired into the Indians and into other soldiers 
on the opposite side of the camp, while the Indians retreated into the hills. Until then, 
their operators unable to see through the fog of gunpowder, the Hotchkiss guns had been 
silent. 6 As the Indians began separating themselves from the soldiers, however, the big 
guns began firing into the Indian camp, where the young men had fled. Lodges caught 
fire as men, women and children fell. The survivors began running toward a ravine, 
where they managed to find shelter from the soldiers’ rifles. 6 
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According to Smith, up to this point, the battle could hardly be called a massacre, 
as soldiers and Indians fought for survival in nearly equal measure. 6 However, as the 
exploding Hotchkiss shells began raking the surviving Indians in the ravine, it could be 
argued the soldiers could have retreated to a safe distance and made peace overtures. But 
as the Indians in the ravine continued firing on the soldiers, the soldiers felt the need to 
return their fire. 6 “The result was that both the Indians and the soldiers were caught up in 
one of those too often repeated tragedies of history wherein each side goes on fighting for 
the sole reason that the other side is; thus the senseless carnage continued.” 6 
By the time it was over and the Indians’ guns in the ravine fell silent, 37 soldiers, 
two civilians and 51 Indians lay wounded, and 25 soldiers and at least 170 Indian men, 
women and children lay dead in the fields and hills. 6 Just three reporters had witnessed 
the fighting first-hand: Charles W. Allen of the Chadron Democrat, Cressey of the 
Omaha Daily Bee and William F. Kelley of the Lincoln State Journal. 3 Thinking nothing 
was likely to happen as Forsyth disarmed Big Foot’s band, Tibbles had left the camp 
earlier that morning but returned after hearing firing from Wounded Knee as he rode 
away. Later, he and his fellow journalists raced to Rushville to try to telegraph the first 
report of the incident.  
According to historian Hugh J. Reilly, Cressey beat his colleagues in reporting the 
events of Dec. 29, 1890. Under the headline “A Bloody Battle” and a subheadline 
“Details Given by the Bee’s Correspondent – Who Was on the Field of Battle,” Cressey 
offered few details beyond that a fight had occurred after the Seventh Cavalry had tried to 
disarm Big Foot’s band. 40 “Their first volley was almost as one man, so that they must 
have fired a hundred shots before the soldiers fired one,” he said of the Indians. 40  
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Cressey described Wallace as dying after being struck with a tomahawk in the 
head. He counted as many as 34 soldiers who had been killed but offered no information 
about the number of dead Indians. The next day, Cressey said 156 Indians had bit the 
dust, including 40 “squaws.” He counted 24 soldiers among the dead. 40 In the next day’s 
edition, Cressey described how the Indian women had been killed after trying to stab the 
soldiers with knives, while describing the soldiers as “gallant, utterly fearless.” But he 
also bemoaned the death of Indian children, whom he described as paying as much 
attention to the slaughter around them as if it were “so much conversation.” 41  
The World-Herald took a decidedly different tack in its coverage, portraying it as 
a massacre rather than a valiant battle. While the paper’s first report of Wounded Knee 
bore the headline “ALL MURDERED IN A MASS, Big Foot and All His Followers Shot 
Down Without Regard to Sex,” the actual story very much resembled the Omaha Daily 
Bee’s account in its praise for the soldiers’ actions and its criticism of the Indians’ 
“treachery.” 42 Quoting Secretary of War Redfield Proctor, the World-Herald wrote: “He 
supposed inasmuch as Big Foot was connected with Sitting Bull’s band it was a case 
where the Indians wanted revenge for the killing of their friend.” 42 However, the World-
Herald attempted to provide some explanation for the Indians’ actions, describing them 
as “half starved.”  
Yet, in that first story, the World-Herald also engaged in the kind of doomsday 
prophesying that it had tried to avoid prior to Wounded Knee, predicting a “bloody war” 
as a result of the slaughter. 42 Closer to Wounded Knee, the Dawes County Journal in 
Chadron, Neb., just 30 miles from Pine Ridge, offered its first lengthy report of tensions 
at the agency with a Jan. 2, 1891, story that blamed Yellow Horse for firing the first shot. 
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He drew a gun and fired upon the guard stationed over the captured arms, when 
hundreds of guns cracked and a bloody fight was on. The medicine man was the 
first to fall, pierced by five bullets. A frenzy seized the troops and with the battle 
cry of “Remember Custer; remember ’76,” they fought without quarter. 43 
 
As hostility erupted across the reservation following Wounded Knee, the 
Nebraska newspapers returned to their usual pattern of offering doomsday predictions 
and blaming either the government, military or Indians for the deaths of soldiers and 
Indians. La Flesche blamed the slaughter on the government’s desire for the Indians’ 
land.  
If the white people want their land and must have it, they can go about getting it 
in some other way than by forcing it from them by starving or provoking them to 
war and sacrificing the lives of innocent women and children, and through the 
sufferings of the wives and children of officers and soldiers. 21 
 
Tibbles, meanwhile, called upon all Indian bureau employees to resign and be 
replaced by military officers, as requested by Gen. Miles. “They must know that the 
whole mass of Indians hate them,” he wrote of the Indian bureau employees. 44 Miles 
later relieved Col. Forsyth of his command of the Seventh Cavalry, mostly because of his 
deployment of troops at Wounded Knee, though Forsyth also received plenty of criticism 
for the murder of women and children. Forsyth was eventually given back command of 
the Seventh Cavalry after being exonerated during a court-martial that Miles had 
requested. 9  
Reacting to further deployment of soldiers into the reservation, Tibbles offered a 
cynical assessment: “It makes my heart sad to see these gallant officers and men ride out 
to die that contractors may grow rich and a few politicians have an office.” 45 Cressey of 
the Omaha Daily Bee, on the other hand, offered a spirited defense of Royer, quoting a 
dispatch sent by the agent to the War Department as saying Royer hated asking for 
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military assistance, knowing that the presence of soldiers very likely would turn the 
Indians against him. 46 Cressey quoted other Indian agents, as well as area business and 
religious leaders, as supporting Royer’s decision to request military assistance. One 
Presbyterian clergyman, Rev. C.G. Sterling, offered the most contemplative assessment 
on the subject: 
I do not think that an outbreak was imminent, yet it is beyond question that the 
Indians were growing steadily more sullen and defiant. Altogether, despite some 
unfortunate results which followed the coming of the troops, I am disposed to 
believe that we are better off for their coming and that the settlement, which it 
was plain must soon be had, will now be the more speedily and satisfactorily 
accomplished. 46 
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A senseless tragedy 
Like so many historical events that have been elevated into myth, the Wounded 
Knee Massacre can’t be easily boxed and wrapped for future generations with such clear 
lines between good and evil as the myth has produced. 3 Rather, the tragedy is much more 
complex, its seeds planted within the soil of an ever-expanding democracy hungry for 
more land and yet also striving to live up to the ideals of its forefathers.  
It was a clash precipitated by a press as hungry for news as the nervous and 
isolated settler was for military security. Almost inevitably, those who told the story of 
this final confrontation of the Indians Wars became the mouthpieces for this land-hungry, 
Indian-fearing population of settlers and, eventually, the voices of a nation ashamed and 
indignant at the slaughter of their country’s indigenous people. While they very likely fed 
the very fear that eventually led to the slaughter at Wounded Knee, the reporters at Pine 
Ridge also attempted at times to allay growing fears of conflict and tried to find solutions 
to prevent further bloodshed after the battle was over. 
Writing of the massacre many years later, Lakota holy man Black Elk said the 
slaughter of men, women in children at Wounded Knee had broken his people’s sacred 
hoop: 
I did not know how much was ended. When I look back now from this high hill of 
my old age, I can still see the butchered women and children lying heaped and 
scattered all along the crooked gulch as plain as when I saw them with eyes still 
young. And I can see that something else died there in the bloody mud, and was 
buried in the blizzard. A people’s dream died there. It was a beautiful dream. 47 
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For journalists assigned to cover battlefields today, the needless deaths of so 
many Native people and the journalists’ contribution to that event can offer a lesson for 
future war coverage. Whether that lesson will take seed remains to be seen. 
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Chapter III: Wounded Knee 1973 
The headline, “South Dakota Trading Post is ‘Captured’” that appeared in the 
Feb. 28, 1973, Omaha World-Herald offered the readers of Nebraska’s largest newspaper 
their first indication of trouble at Wounded Knee. 48 The United Press International story 
offered 11 paragraphs on the news that would dominate that newspaper and others for the 
next two months. The story quoted Pine Ridge Indian Reservation police as saying the 
takeover began because American Indian Movement leader Russell Means was beaten in 
Pine Ridge. The story also quoted Mrs. Clive Gildersleeve, whose husband managed the 
trading post at Wounded Knee. She said residents near the trading post were barricaded 
in their homes. “We’re afraid we might get shot at. There’s been shooting for an hour.” 48 
Across the country, headlines jerked Americans preoccupied with the growing 
Watergate scandal out of their daily routines in late February 1973 to inform them of a 
takeover of a tiny hamlet on a forgotten, picturesque corner of South Dakota by militant 
members of AIM, an organization responsible for violence and similar takeovers of 
courthouses and federal buildings in preceding months and years. From nearby 
newspapers like the Omaha World-Herald and the two daily newspapers in Lincoln, 
Neb., to massive dailies like The New York Times, newspapers published wire service 
accounts of the siege as well as staff-written stories. They would complement daily 
coverage of the events with staff editorials and letters to the editor written by 
sympathizers of AIM and angry non-Indians who were tired of the government allowing 
lawlessness and destruction of private property. 
Like their predecessors of nearly a century before, the hundreds of American and 
foreign journalists who swarmed onto the Pine Ridge Reservation in March 1973 would 
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employ stereotypes of the noble savage, but this time their subjects would be wearing 
cowboy hats and thrusting their rifles into the air in acts of defiance against a government 
for which they felt only anger because of what they said was willful neglect. Those 
journalists would describe scenes reminiscent of dime store Western novels where tough, 
bawdy lawmen rode into lawless towns on horses to exact a ruthless justice on instigators 
of violence. This time, the bad guys weren’t unruly cowboys, a la Billy and brother Ike 
Clanton, antagonists of the October 1881 shootout at the O.K. Corral, but the federal 
government itself and a decidedly unlikable plumber-turned-chairman of the Oglala 
Sioux Tribe, Richard Wilson. 
But the press that rode into town in 1973 wasn’t the same one that had covered 
the 1890 massacre. In 1923, the American Society of Newspaper Editors had adopted a 
code of ethics that included principles of sincerity, truthfulness, accuracy and 
impartiality. 93 They would seek to speak to both sides involved in the conflict, rather 
than rely on military or government officials to relay information to them as reporters in 
1890 often did. Certainly, the reporters of 1973 didn’t always live up to the standards 
they had set for themselves, but their coverage certainly proved far more balanced and 
comprehensive than the coverage in 1890. 
Lured by stunning images and a rich history of bloodstained snow and soil, 
newspaper reporters, TV news crews and radio reporters jockeyed for position along the 
federal cordon that grew around Wounded Knee. And they didn’t hesitate to draw 
comparisons between the 1890 massacre and the 1973 siege. “Once again – faced not 
with the religious fervor of the Ghost Dancers but with the political rage of the Red 
Power activists – the white establishment reacted with uncertainty and a show of force,” 
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wrote John Kifner for The New York Times on March 4, 1973, in a story headlined, “The 
Ghosts Dance Once Again at Wounded Knee.” 49 
Soon, however, the romanticism of Wounded Knee II would wear thin as news 
companies’ budgets and interests waned with the endless negotiations and lack of access 
to Wounded Knee. By April 2, The New York Times’ Kifner wrote about the dwindling 
corps of journalists covering the confrontation. “In the first days of the seizure, hundreds 
of newsmen raced about here, fighting for the pay phone in the parking lot of the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs Building or the one in the Crazy Horse Café, the town’s only eatery, 
sneaking up creekbeds and arroyos past the Government roadblocks or jamming into 
Federal briefings,” Kifner wrote. 50 “Now only a handful of reporters is left, making the 
27-mile drive each night to a bowling alley in Rushville, Neb., that has the nearest 
restaurant and where white patrons eye them darkly and make loud remarks about ‘the 
national press.’” 50 
As the days dragged on with little hope of an end to the conflict, newspaper 
editorials became increasingly critical of the standoff. “As media theater, and particularly 
as television fare, the Siege of Wounded Knee has been a producer’s dream,” a World-
Herald staff editorial proclaimed on March 10. 51 “It has everything: A picturesque 
setting in the lonely hill country of the Pine Ridge, where the ghosts of the 1890 massacre 
can be summoned by the drop of a cliché or the snap of a director’s finger … the 
mystique of the Vanishing American … the heady fragrance of protest … the spice of 
violence … ” 51 
While the reporters aggressively sought out each day’s news from Wounded 
Knee, however, they would fail to investigate claims made by both sides of the 
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increasingly violent struggle. They would report each week about the American Indian 
Movement’s claims that Chairman Wilson had mishandled the tribe’s affairs and hired 
his cronies for positions within tribal government, but they never bothered to actually 
examine whether Wilson had, in fact, committed these alleged acts. 52 For the first few 
days of the siege, they would quote federal authorities as saying the Indian activists 
possessed an M-60 machine gun capable of wiping out a large group of men. However, 
reporters failed to ask the activists for the first few days to see the gun, thereby allowing 
federal authorities to raise the unlikely specter of federal authorities being wiped out by 
the Indians they had surrounded. 53 
Journalists also struggled to communicate the often incoherent demands of the 
Indian instigators, including their demands that Senate committees investigate corruption 
within the Bureau of Indian Affairs and violation of various treaties signed by Sioux 
tribes with the federal government. As a result, reporters increasingly described the 
conflict as essentially a war of personalities between publicity-hungry activists Means 
and Dennis Banks and power-hungry Chairman Wilson. They described it as a conflict 
between reservation Indians, like Wilson, and urban Indians, like Means and Banks. A 
March 8 Associated Press story in the Lincoln Star, headlined “Indian Factional Quarrels 
Bitter,” clearly portrayed the conflict as between Chairman Wilson, whom it described as 
an angry “plumber, father of six children,” while it described AIM leader Russell Means 
as a “rangy, handsome Sioux who is a rallying point for dissidents on the Pine Ridge 
Indian Reservation.” 54 “I’m not going to let them take over this reservation. If they do, it 
will be over my dead body,” Wilson said. He accused Means of only wanting publicity 
and threatened to overrun Wounded Knee with 1,000 Indians. 54 
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Journalistic obsessions would extend beyond the clash of powerful personalities 
as reporters became preoccupied with describing the weapons employed by both sides 
and painting vivid scenes of nearly nightly shootouts as the reporters attempted to cover 
the conflict as they would a war. And they would weigh their stories down with heavy 
rhetoric employed by both federal agents and Indian activists. “We will either have a re-
enactment of the Wounded Knee massacre or they (federal officials) will have to deal 
with the Oglala Sioux on our terms,” said AIM leader Carter Camp on March 5. 55  
But the papers also would try to ease fears among both Indians and whites 
through staff editorials and quotes from peace-seeking clergy attempting to stave off an 
impending slaughter like the one that had claimed so many of the activists’ forefathers. 
Although voices of the Indian survivors of the 1890 massacre largely were absent from 
news coverage of that event, newspapers in 1973 quoted the Indian activists under siege 
by federal authorities almost daily, at least until the government closed access to the 
village in an attempt to starve the publicity-driven activists of attention.  
The newspapers also presented views from prominent Native American political 
and intellectual leaders who weren’t manning bunkers inside the village, such as author 
Vine Deloria and Mohawk activist Richard Oakes, as well as prominent Native American 
advocates such as publishing executive Alvin M. Josephy. Josephy wrote a particularly 
interesting story for The New York Times that attempted to describe the political changes 
the Indians at Wounded Knee wanted. “Must the ‘Indian problem’ (really the white 
man’s problem) go on then, with more human misery and suffering, for another 
generation?” Josephy wrote. 56 “It is abundantly clear that it need not. As a first step, the 
Nixon Administration can – indeed, must – restore the policy of tribal self-determination 
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as enunciated in the President’s message of 1970, halting the diffusion of Indian interests 
throughout the Government, supporting again the goals of former Commissioner (Louis) 
Bruce, and establishing accessibility for aggrieved Indians to a decision-making center in 
the White House.” 56 
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The romantic Indian 
At first, news reporters seemed infatuated with the crackle of gunfire and the 
sudden showdown between armed federal lawmen and Native American activists at a 
village whose blood-soaked roots stained the pages of America’s history books. The New 
York Times especially demonstrated no reluctance to squeeze every ounce of historical 
analogy out of the confrontation. A March 1 story, headlined “Wounded Knee, S.D., a 
Symbol of Bitter Past and Future Hope,” began with these words: “Wounded Knee, S.D., 
a cluster of drab buildings on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation in the southwest corner 
of the state, was the site of the last armed incident pitting Indians against the United 
States Government.” 57 But while its coverage at first focused on young, angry Indian 
activists, the newspaper also expressed a disconnect between the noble savage of old and 
modern Indians. In a March 2 story, Times reporter Kifner described how Indians lined 
up outside a Bureau of Indian Affairs building in Pine Ridge, S.D., “their heads shaded 
from the hot sun by a variety of hats, watched with expressionless faces.” 58 His 
description of listless Indians certainly didn’t match stereotypical images of savage, 
bloodthirsty Indians. 
While certainly not immune to racial and historical stereotyping, newspapers in 
Nebraska demonstrated a much more rigid, straightforward approach to covering the 
siege. It’s unclear, however, whether Nebraska’s three largest newspapers were actively 
attempting to provide balanced coverage of the violent showdown or whether they simply 
weren’t moved by “windswept prairies” and historical analogies. The Nebraska 
newspapers certainly demonstrated the same predilection toward covering the daily 
shootouts between federal authorities and the Indian activists, even going so far as to 
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offer daily tallies on the number of bullets expended by both sides. “Government officials 
said Wednesday that federal personnel exchanged about 250 rounds of ammunition 
Tuesday night with the occupying Indians. No injuries were reported,” World-Herald 
reporter Al Frisbie wrote in a March 8 story from Wounded Knee. 59 Mostly, the 
Nebraska newspapers and The New York Times attempted to quote representatives from 
both AIM and the federal contingent surrounding them. 
The takeover of Wounded Knee was only the most recent in a series of acts of 
civil disobedience by AIM that had begun Nov. 2, 1972. On that date, the activists took 
over the Bureau of Indian Affairs building in Washington, D.C., after failing to gain 
audience with White House representatives. The activists were facing multiple charges 
stemming from their destruction of the federal building and documents inside even as 
they drove in a caravan into Wounded Knee in late February.  
On Jan. 21, 1973, a Lakota named Wesley Bad Heart Bull, 20, died of stab 
wounds inflicted by a white man, who was charged with second-degree manslaughter. 58 
In early February, AIM activists demonstrated in Custer, S.D., protesting what they 
considered to be a light charge for Bad Heart Bull’s killer. They burned a Chamber of 
Commerce building down, as well as a courthouse. They also damaged a bar and fought 
locals, as well as authorities, before the National Guard arrived to quell the situation. 58  
Anger among Indians and whites had been simmering for months by the time 
Indian activists arrived in Wounded Knee. “We’ve tried to talk, talk, talk to your 
government, and they never listen,” said a young Oglala Sioux man during a press 
conference held by University of Nebraska students in Lincoln on March 2. 60 “We have 
almost decided to stage a war against you. But we’re asking one more time at Wounded 
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Knee. And if you are willing to talk, we’ll talk.” However, two of the NU students spoke 
against the occupation, and one even called the idea of taking over an entire town 
“bizarre.” 60 
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Of hostages, images and history 
When they arrived at Wounded Knee, American Indian Movement members 
initially held 11 village residents hostage in an effort to dissuade federal authorities from 
entering the village. But the status of the 11 village residents became a point of 
contention as the siege continued. AIM members argued the residents all had decided 
they wanted to remain in their homes rather than leave, and federal authorities expressed 
disbelief that the residents weren’t being held against their will.  
The activists’ efforts to convince federal authorities and the public that the 11 
residents were no longer hostages tested the young movement’s ability to handle the 
media. Even an interview of the hostages by South Dakota Sen. James Abourezk failed to 
convince federal authorities. “They say that they’ve been told that they’re free to go out 
of Wounded Knee if they want to. But they don’t want to go because they live there,” 
Abourezk told the World-Herald on March 1. 61 The next day, however, Ralph Erickson, 
special assistant to the U.S. attorney general, told the newspaper that he wasn’t convinced 
the hostages had been given permission to leave the village. “We may have to rethink the 
whole thing pretty soon,” he said. 62  
Harper’s reporter Terri Schultz later called the hostage situation at Wounded 
Knee a ploy by the activists to dramatize the situation and entice media coverage of the 
event. 11 In a March 4 story for the Omaha World-Herald, staff writer Al Frisbie quoted 
one of the “hostages” in Wounded Knee, William Riegert, 81, who said he and the other 
10 residents decided to remain in the village to protect their property from federal 
authorities. “The fact is that we as a group of hostages decided to stay to save AIM and 
our own property. Had we not, those troops would have come down and killed all of 
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these people. AIM didn’t hold us, it was the military that holds us, the real hostages here 
were the AIM people,” Riegert said. 63  
Eventually, federal authorities stopped making an issue of the hostages after 
several were released and confirmed the activists’ claims that they had not been held 
against their will after the first few days of the siege. 
But while most news reports in the first days of the siege focused on shootouts 
and heated rhetoric, some reporters went out of their way to describe scenes that 
challenged the idea many readers probably had that the entire reservation was a war zone. 
Frisbie of the World-Herald described a peaceful scene inside Wounded Knee in a March 
2 story. “Thursday afternoon the entire Wounded Knee settlement was a picture of 
tranquility. At the hilltop church, Indians, both young and old, sat on the grass in 
springlike weather while others prepared meals in the basement and others slept on the 
pews.” 61 
Meanwhile, newspapers became increasingly critical of AIM’s violent methods. 
“What has happened again, however, is that AIM’s demands, while being dramatized, 
have gone unresolved,” wrote the Lincoln Star in a March 6 staff editorial. 64 “The stated 
objectives of the takeover – to force a review of U.S. treaty obligations to the Indians and 
an exposure of alleged corruption and malfeasance in the Bureau of Indians Affairs – 
have been lost in the confrontation.” 64 And Indians across the country who had watched 
AIM’s violent methods for the past year – including an alleged cousin of Russell Means – 
began speaking out against the takeover. The woman, whom the Lincoln Star declined to 
name in a March 4, 1973, story, said her cousin never did anything to help anyone and his 
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actions at Wounded Knee were making life difficult for Indians living off the reservation. 
65 “Now, we are looked on with suspicion,” she said.  
Nearer to the siege, Chairman Wilson and his supporters unleashed a barrage of 
criticism of AIM’s actions. One of his aides even criticized the media for glorifying the 
troublemakers at Wounded Knee. “Means, Banks, or any of them guys sneeze real loud 
and they make a story out of it,” he told the Lincoln Star in a March 4 story. 65 A March 
6, 1973, editorial that appeared in the Evening Journal, “Risk at Wounded Knee,” offered 
a surprisingly sage critique of AIM’s actions in South Dakota. The editorial urged AIM 
leaders to give up their siege now that they had gained valuable national exposure for 
their concerns. The editorial cited visits to Wounded Knee by two U.S. senators, James 
Abourezk and George McGovern, both of South Dakota, as well as assurances that the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee would review treaties with Indians. 66 “What more 
could the Indians accomplish by continuing their occupation of Wounded Knee? Not 
much, probably, except to alienate more and more officials and citizens,” the staff 
editorial opined in a particularly prophetic statement. 66 
The photos published by the newspapers in many ways spoke louder and in a 
much clearer voice to readers, including a March 4 United Press International photo that 
appeared in the Lincoln Star that showed two activists riding a riding lawnmower, one 
waving a rifle and the other carrying a tomahawk. 67 Images like this seemed to hearken 
to Old West stereotypes of bloodthirsty savages on the warpath.  
A March 5 photo in the Lincoln Star showed an Indian, Oscar Bear Runner, 
wearing a parka and headband and holding up a rifle as Indians behind him erected a tipi. 
68 The photo spoke in no unclear terms of the anger and cultural pride felt by the Indians. 
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A particularly revealing package of photos and story that appeared in the March 20 
Lincoln Evening Journal depicted the lives of ordinary Wounded Knee residents who 
weren’t part of the American Indian Movement. “AIM is a very small minority of the 
population of Wounded Knee, where for most of the people life goes on hardly 
disrupted,” wrote staff reporter Betty Stevens, one of the only Evening Journal reporters 
sent to report from the reservation. 69 
Not all the news coverage coming out of Wounded Knee, however, focused on 
the flash of muzzles and the shaking of fists. Newspaper editorial staffs and reporters also 
attempted to step back at times to consider the plight of the Indian and offer suggestions 
on how to improve relations with tribes. They also attempted to serve as intermediaries 
between non-Indians who understood little about the conflict’s historical foundation and 
the Indians.  
“Americans of today need not assume a burden of guilt for what the white man 
did to the Indians over a period of four centuries, but it is fair enough that they should 
feel guilty for the squalor in which the remnants of a proud civilization have since been 
living – from the last armed confrontation in 1890 to this week’s exchange of heavy 
gunfire,” The New York Times wrote in a March 2 staff editorial. 70 “It is not 
coincidental but deliberately symbolic that both incidents should have occurred in the 
same hamlet of the Oglala Sioux, as though the intervening 83 years were no more than a 
lull in the battle.”  The editorial called on the Bureau of Indian Affairs to grant greater 
self-governance to tribes. “Where that approach has been tried – notably with the 
Miccosukee tribe in Florida – the change has promoted peace and the hope of a better 
life.” 70  
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Indeed, many newspaper editorial writers and prominent columnists agreed that 
tribes needed greater control over their own affairs. “The solution is – if both groups dare 
move toward it – to round out Indian autonomy on the reservations, to stop doing things 
‘for’ the Indians and to help them do things for themselves, and also to ease the path of 
integration for those who want to take it,” wrote New York Post columnist Max Lerner in 
a March 19 column that appeared in the Lincoln Evening Journal. 71  
A March 27 staff editorial in the Evening Journal, “Forked tongue?”, called on the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee to keep its word and review treaties with Indians to 
determine whether the federal government had kept its word and, if not, what could be 
done to meet the demands of those treaties. 72 “Let us have law and order, say those who 
disapprove of the Indian protests. What could be more lawful than solemn treaties entered 
into by our government? What could be more orderly than thoughtful, practical 
interpretation and implementation of those treaties?” 72 
Perhaps the most enlightening piece written far from the action at Wounded Knee 
came from a Native American advocate and author of numerous books about Indians, 
including the historical anthology “Red Power,” one of the first accounts of the 
contemporary campaign for Indian rights. Alvin M. Josephy, whose books depicted the 
struggles of Indians past and present, wrote a lengthy story, “What the Indians want,” for 
the March 18, 1973, edition of The New York Times. In the story, Josephy attempted to 
explain why more than 200 angry Indians had charged into a quiet village in South 
Dakota in order to assert their rights and take a stand against what they considered 
government corruption, both Indian and non-Indian.  
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Josephy focused on the political and social roots of current Indian discontent, 
including the failure of Congress to enact legislation proposed by then President Richard 
M. Nixon that would have granted tribes greater power to govern themselves. 56 The 
subsequent actions of officials within the Department of the Interior, who feared granting 
tribes greater powers of self-governance would undermine their own power, began to 
work to undermine the power of those within the department who supported Nixon’s 
efforts, particularly Louis R. Bruce, the commissioner of Indian Affairs, the son of a 
Mohawk and a Sioux, a man “beloved by most Indians in the country.” Under Bruce’s 
leadership, the Bureau of Indian Affairs had been shaken up and “brilliant and dedicated 
young Indians were brought in to head Bureau activities as policy makers,” Josephy 
wrote. 56 The BIA’s appropriations soared from $243 million in 1968 to more than $530 
million five years later.  
So why did the American Indian Movement enjoy such strong support within 
traditional tribal communities? Josephy argued the Interior Department, while 
blossoming under Bruce’s leadership, still struggled to overcome hardline department 
officials who were reluctant to give up control over Indian natural resources. For decades, 
the interior department served as the arbiter of natural resources on Indian lands and was 
able to use that power to exercise control over various tribes and their leaders, as well as 
to grant access to those resources to private interests that the department favored. 56  
“Any move toward self-determination, any restructuring of the Indian Bureau that 
permitted the Indians to edge closer to decision-making authority over their own affairs 
(i.e., to get out of control), was something to oppose,” Josephy wrote. The “old 
bureaucrats,” in turn, “whipped up fears and jealousies among reservation tribal chairman 
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against the young Indian ‘militants,’ who, they said, had come to the Bureau from the 
cities, did not know the problems of the reservations and were instituting policies that 
would hurt the reservation Indians.” 56  
The bureaucrats’ efforts to influence tribal leaders, as well as members of the 
Senate and House interior committees, eventually resulted in their gaining authority to 
strip Bruce of his powers and install a part Indian old-liner like themselves, John O. 
Crow. Under Crow, the movement toward tribal self-determination came to a screeching 
halt. However, tribal leaders across the country quickly began protesting the changes and 
the push against self-determination. 56 “A partial reversal followed, but the damage was 
done,” Josephy wrote.  
While much of Bruce’s powers were restored, Harrison Loesch, assistant 
secretary for public land management, one of the most vociferous critics of self-
determination, continued to work to undermine Bruce. The result was the inability of 
tribes to establish systems of government that reflected their cultural views and the 
continued alienation of many Indian people from their duly elected leaders, whom they 
often viewed as puppets of Interior Department officials and ever too eager to 
accommodate outside efforts to exploit tribal resources, Josephy wrote. 56 He called on 
the Nixon administration to renew its efforts to grant tribes greater powers of self-
governance and Congress to pass legislation that furthers that effort.  
Josephy also recommended strict observance by the federal government of Indian 
treaties and establishing institutional access to the White House by aggrieved Indians. “It 
must, in addition now, go further by enabling the Indian peoples to attain true political 
freedom and liberties that will permit them to establish forms of government of their own 
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choosing.” Josephy, however, didn’t necessarily condone the American Indian 
Movement’s methods for gaining the ear of federal leaders. “And as they protest and 
demonstrate with the only method they have to call attention to their plight, the method 
itself hardens the attitude of the white law-enforcement agencies toward them in a 
manner that recalls the 19th-century use of troops against their forefathers, and further 
divides the Indians between the fearful ones, the venal ones and the determined patriots.” 
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Few newspapers, however, attempted to understand or explain the activists’ 
demands to the degree Josephy did. Closer to the action, the Chadron, Neb., newspaper, 
the Record, published in its March 22 edition a decidedly non-scientific survey of 59 
local residents, asking them about their thoughts on the siege. The newspaper found that 
85 percent of those surveyed disapproved of AIM’s actions leading up to and since the 
Wounded Knee takeover. Another 92 percent disapproved of the government’s handling 
of the siege. 73  
The newspaper stated its own position in the same edition: “The natives are 
getting restless. Across the prairie there is a rising rumbling of resentment and rebellion 
against the continued lawless activities of one small minority element that is threatening 
the homes, property and even lives of the people of this area. And these activities are 
being carried out under the very eyes of the authorities whose sworn duty it is to bring all 
law-breakers to justice.” 74 The editorial then devolved into rumor and innuendo, as it 
relayed talk of the Indians taking over other sites, including Fort Robinson, a former 
Army outpost in western Nebraska where the Lakota warrior Crazy Horse was killed in 
September 1877 and where a band of imprisoned Cheyenne broke out two years later. 
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The editorial also spoke of local residents wanting to arm themselves to fight the Indian 
activists and lamented Wounded Knee’s dark past. “It was a regrettable incident, to be 
sure, a black mark for the U.S. troops that will never be erased. But digging up all those 
graves on that quiet hillside will never bring back to life Chief Bigfoot and his people or 
erase this incident. But a continuation of what is going on at Wounded Knee may very 
likely spark the start of something else that would (be) far more serious and more 
regrettable than Wounded Knee ever thought of being.” 74 
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Army of journalists 
Compared to the 21 correspondents who covered the 1890 massacre, more than 
100 journalists of three media – newspaper, radio and television – followed federal 
authorities to the reservation and the Indians into Wounded Knee. In a March 4 World-
Herald story headlined “Influx of Press Strains Accommodations,” reporter and 
photographer Richard Janda described how American journalists and journalists from as 
far away as Germany, England and France had filled all the nearby hotel rooms and had 
begun sleeping in their cars and rented campers. 75 Their sheer number was burdening all 
available resources, most notably public pay phones of which just four or five could be 
found in Pine Ridge 20 miles away from Wounded Knee, though those phones often 
failed to work and just ate coins. “By Saturday, newsmen had settled into the daily 
routine – arrive at Pine Ridge, go to the Bureau of Indian Affairs building, check with 
Justice Department officials, attend news briefings there and exchange reports, factual or 
rumored,” he wrote. 75 
Reporters also fought to regain access to Wounded Knee after federal officials 
closed access to the village. AIM leaders complained that depriving them of press 
coverage offered federal authorities greater advantage in gaining public approval of their 
tactics and refused to negotiate toward the end of the siege. “Mr. Means said that the 
Government had entered a conspiracy with the press to try to paint the Wounded Knee 
occupiers as black as possible in an effort to turn public opinion against them,” reporter 
Martin Waldron wrote for The New York Times on April 23. 76  
The government eventually decided to stop providing daily press briefings for two 
days in early May in order to appease AIM, which requested a government news blackout 
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as a precondition for the resumption of negotiations, according to a May 4 New York 
Times story. 77 However, federal authorities refused to allow the press to contact the 
activists. “I believe that a policy of quasi-isolation is very useful for us,” said Richard 
Hellstern, deputy assistant attorney general. “The (Indians) there miss the press more than 
food.” 77 To get around the federal blockades, and later checkpoints set up by angry 
displaced residents of Wounded Knee, reporters sneaked around those blockades to get 
into the village. A four-man camera crew for the Columbia Broadcasting System even 
was charged with aiding a civil disorder, a felony, after being caught leaving Wounded 
Knee in violation of a federal order to stay out of the village and then returning to the 
village, according to a May 9, 1973, New York Times article. 78 
Journalists found other ways to get information about the situation inside 
Wounded Knee and negotiations between both sides. Omaha World-Herald reporter Al 
Frisbie described lying down outside a tipi situated between the village and the federal 
cordon, where the activists and federal authorities held several negotiations. “You could 
hear about everything being said inside,” he said in an April 1 column written by the 
newspaper’s executive editor, Louis Gerdes. 79 “All you had to do was figure who said 
what. I got quite a bit of information this way.”  
He and reporter Richard Janda described spending 11 days near Wounded Knee 
and logging 3,853 miles on their car. World-Herald reporter Dave Breeder replaced them, 
spending 13 days on the reservation and logging 1,690 miles on a rented car. 79 Frisbie 
said he understood that both activists and federal authorities had attempted to manipulate 
the press to gain favorable public opinion. He described watching AIM leader Russell 
Means direct journalists to various locations in the village. “Okay, press over here,” 
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Means said, as if filming a production. “There was no question the fellows leading were 
wise in the handling of media,” Beeder said. “These were not reservation Indians. They 
all had been exposed to the big cities. … They picked a spot of historical significance. It 
was set up and controlled as well as if Bozell and Jacobs had planned a media survey.” 79  
Beeder also praised Chairman Richard Wilson, whom he said was candid and 
cool in a tense situation. Janda and Frisbie described getting off the road into Wounded 
Knee and walking across the prairie around federal roadblocks to get into the village. But 
once there, the World-Herald journalists said they sometimes felt threatened by younger 
Indians and a white man who wore fur pelts. “There was this one we called Mountain 
Man because of the way he dressed and the fur pelts he carried. He kept pounding a huge 
spike on his shotgun,” Beeder said. “You worried when the leaders weren’t around. The 
potential for violence was always there.” 79 Gerdes described the frustration of the World-
Herald’s journalists as they struggled to paint a complete picture of the events. “It is 
frustrating because all the pieces of the story are not visible or obtainable on the spot at 
the time of confrontation,” he wrote. 79 
The siege finally ended May 9, 1973, after the American Indian Movement 
received a letter from President Nixon’s counsel, Leonard Garment, which promised that 
at least five White House representatives would arrive at the reservation within two 
weeks to discuss the Indians’ grievances. 78 By the time it was all over, two Indians had 
died and two federal agents had been seriously wounded, including an Omaha federal 
marshal who had nearly been paralyzed after being shot in the back. More than 300 
people had been arrested either trying to enter the village or trying leave. Nearly 100 
activists laid down their arms and surrendered the village. “Gentlemen, the village of 
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Wounded Knee is clear,” came the voice of William Hall, deputy director of the U.S. 
marshals, over the radio at 10:19 a.m. May 9. 78  
Journalists attempted to make sense of the 71-day siege. “For many days, except 
for the danger involved, the seizure was like some strange carnival with hundreds of 
policemen surrounding the Indians, who staged and then restaged events for television 
camera crews in their mobile campers,” wrote Andrew H. Malcolm for The New York 
Times on May 9. “It was, as the Sioux chief Crazy Horse once said, a good day to die. 
But today no one did.” 78  
Then, as reporters watched, the displaced residents of Wounded Knee returned 
home and found nearly all of their homes destroyed. The trading post was a mass of 
burned metal and cinders. Trash, dirty clothes and garbage were scattered everywhere. 
Many buildings, including a Catholic church, had been defaced by obscene graffiti, and 
one family’s home had been used as a toilet after electricity and water had been shut off 
in February. “They said they wouldn’t bother the Oglala people. I don’t know why they 
did this to us,” a distraught Margaret Red Eagle said. 80  
AIM leaders attempted to lay blame on federal officials for the damage, saying 
flares shot by authorities had burned several houses and a young girl overturned a 
kerosene lamp in the trading post, causing the building to burn, after federal agents turned 
off power. “We were in an all-out war,” said Vernon Bellecourt, national coordinator of 
AIM. There was “little time for house-keeping,” he told The New York Times for a May 
11, 1973, article. 81  
In a May 13 article headlined “Seeking the Import of Wounded Knee,” Andrew 
H. Malcolm of The New York Times lamented the uncertain legacy that the event would 
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leave future generations of Indians. He quoted AIM attorney Ramon Roubideaux as 
saying the organization would take over other sites unless the government drastically 
reformed its treatment of Indians. 82 Except for a promise to discuss Indians’ grievances, 
the federal government had conceded little to the activists but had spent nearly $5 million 
to contain them, Malcolm wrote. “But this weekend here no one could be sure that the 
second Battle of Wounded Knee was not the first of a new kind of Indian war.” 82 
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Reassessing history 
Malcolm’s words would prove prophetic, though not in the manner he probably 
expected. The Wounded Knee siege was, in fact, the last major takeover by the American 
Indian Movement. While takeovers of buildings have become commonplace for Indians 
across the country attempting to assert their rights, those takeovers typically involve 
much smaller sites and far fewer activists, and they certainly don’t command the kind of 
worldwide attention that the Wounded Knee takeover did in 1973. For example, a 
takeover of an elderly care center in Porcupine, S.D., on the Pine Ridge Indian 
Reservation in March 2011 by activists protesting what they alleged was substandard care 
for the Oglala Sioux Tribe’s elderly members garnered scant coverage by South Dakota 
newspapers and virtually no national coverage. 
Meanwhile, historians, journalists and Indian leaders continue to debate the 
siege’s legacy. The event’s immediate impact appeared to be more killings and political 
upheaval on the Pine Ridge Reservation as Means and Wilson challenged each other in 
February 1974 for the tribe’s chairmanship. Assaults with deadly weapons at Pine Ridge 
had increased by 200 percent by the time Harper’s Magazine reporter Terri Schultz 
arrived in late January 1974. 83 AIM leader Pedro Bissonette had been shot and killed by 
reservation police while resisting arrest the prior October. “Since the long siege of last 
spring, the Indians on the reservation had divided into opposing camps, and each faction 
had suffered heavy casualties on the behalf of its beliefs,” Schultz wrote. 83 Wilson 
eventually won the election by more than 200 votes out of 3,200 cast. A drunken man 
approached Schultz the next morning after the election. “I’m one of Wilson’s goons, and 
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I’m proud of it, and you people in the press better write about us for once, instead of 
AIM.” 83 
As for the press’ coverage of the event, many media representatives offered 
stinging words. In its June 1973 edition, Harper’s Magazine blasted journalists from New 
York (a veiled reference to The New York Times) for contriving to “force the shambles 
at Wounded Knee into the standard forms of dogmatic melodrama. They figured there 
was enough pathos in it to warrant a few weeks of news, and they arrived in the Black 
Hills with the story already marked out into a romantic fiction of the Old West.” 84 The 
magazine praised two Chicago newspapers, the Tribune and the Sun-Times, for 
recognizing the “fraudulence of the Dakota uprising” and describing it with “scornful 
humor.” 84 Certainly, The New York Times and other members of the media often lapsed 
into old habits of becoming infatuated with the Indians’ dress, heavy rhetoric and 
melodramatic actions (i.e., burning a government peace proposal and sending the ashes 
back in an envelope).  
However, compared to their predecessors in the 19th century, newspapers and 
other media certainly succeeded in offering much more balanced coverage of Wounded 
Knee II by attempting to and often succeeding in gaining comments from the Indian 
activists and the Oglala Sioux leaders opposed to them despite federal authorities’ efforts 
to close off the village from the outside world. And whereas only one Native American 
reporter covered the Wounded Knee massacre in 1890, numerous Indian journalists 
covered the siege 83 years later, and one Indian editor of a tribal newspaper, Aaron 
DeSersa, even served as AIM’s spokesman and most ardent advocate. 
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When I began my research into the coverage of the Wounded Knee massacre, I 
was shocked to find rampant stereotypical and racist references to Indians, as well as a 
general neglect of Indian perspectives. Indeed, only the Omaha World-Herald – home to 
the only Indian reporter who covered the Wounded Knee massacre, Suzette La Flesche, 
and her husband, Thomas H. Tibbles, long a friend to Indians – presented interviews with 
Indian survivors immediately after the massacre. In terms of the newspapers’ coverage 
leading up to the massacre, I indeed found that coverage to be heavily laden with 
sensational rumors about alleged Indian attacks on settlers, many of which were later 
countered by military officers. 
As I researched coverage of the Wounded Knee siege, I certainly found some 
stereotyping by the newspapers I examined, especially regarding the images they 
presented. While newspapers have always been prone to publish the most startling photos 
they find, images of gun-wielding Indians seemed to dominate coverage of the event, 
despite the fact that about half of the siege participants were federal officers trying to 
prevent Indians from entering or leaving the village. I also found a few quotes from non-
Indians, both federal officers and white residents of nearby towns, that reflected racism 
toward Indians. However, I didn’t find any references to savages or noble Indians by 
reporters. And though I found some evidence of bias toward the Indian activists, I 
wouldn’t say that the majority of the coverage favored either the Indians or the federal 
authorities. 
In many ways, the differences were the result of the evolution of both the media 
and Native American social and political awareness. 
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In 1890, newspaper coverage before the massacre painted a portrait of an 
increasingly desperate situation on and around the Pine Ridge Reservation as the federal 
Indian agent at the reservation, Dr. D.F. Royer, called upon the military to suppress a 
feared rebellion by Oglala Lakota taking part in the Ghost Dance. Many Lakota believed 
the Ghost Dance would lead to the buffalo returning, the white people disappearing from 
the land and the Lakota being able to live in their traditional ways again.  
The Indians gathered in large numbers in the Badlands near the agency to dance 
and sing, and many non-Indians, especially agent Royer, feared they would attempt to 
break out of the reservation and attack settlers. Indeed, many newspaper reports quoted 
nervous settlers near the agency who accused Lakota warriors of attacking their homes 
and families. Often, military officials later disputed those reports. 
Many of those reports cited rumor and hearsay when depicting growing violence 
on and around the Pine Ridge Reservation. The journalists’ sensational reports 
undoubtedly helped whip up fear and excitement near and far from the reservation. Some 
historians have even accused newspapers of contributing to the events leading to the 
Wounded Knee massacre. 
After the massacre ended, few newspaper reporters quoted any of the Native 
American survivors, relying almost solely on accounts from military and government 
officials. Likely, the fact that few reporters could speak Lakota contributed to the dearth 
of interviews with Indian survivors. Only one Native American reporter, Suzette La 
Flesche, an Omaha tribal member, reported from Wounded Knee, and she provided some 
of the only interviews of Native American survivors that appeared in the media. 
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The lack of Indian voices both within the news coverage and within the cast of 
reporters who converged on the reservation presented a very one-sided picture of events 
at Wounded Knee. Indeed, early reports from the scene depicted the soldiers as having 
acted heroically and in self-defense. Only days later, after the World-Herald and a few 
other reporters had interviewed Indian survivors, did stories of soldiers shooting unarmed 
women and children began appearing in newspapers. By then, however, interest in the 
event already had likely begun to wane among readers who already had enjoyed the tales 
of military bravery and Indian deceit and preferred not to learn about atrocities 
committed by soldiers. 
In 1973, newspaper reporters arrived at a much different Wounded Knee. No 
longer would the inability to speak Lakota hinder their coverage; most, if not all, of the 
Indian activists at Wounded Knee spoke English. And no longer would the Indians suffer 
from having their stories left untold because of the lack of Indian reporters. Many 
reporters for Indian newspapers arrived at Wounded Knee in 1973.  
Perhaps most importantly, most of the Indians at Wounded Knee had grown up in 
urban communities and understood how to use the media to tell their stories. Indeed, 
many newspaper editorials decried what they considered to be active manipulation of the 
press by the American Indian Movement. Stories of activists like AIM leader Russell 
Means herding newspaper, radio and television reporters to various locations inside 
Wounded Knee to get better photos and videos would rankle many news agencies that 
began to consider the takeover of Wounded Knee largely a publicity event.  
While some of those reporters who arrived at Wounded Knee in 1973 brought 
with them the same predilection for Old West stereotypes that the reporters of 1890 
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demonstrated, many others brought a determination to cover the takeover as they would 
any other story using the tools they had committed themselves to by 1973. 13 Unlike the 
press of 1890, which often spoke from a decidedly political slant, the media of 1973 were 
focused more on objectivity and fairness. Reporters interviewed people from both sides 
and largely tried to leave their opinions, as well as rumors and innuendo, out of their 
reports. 
Out of a sense of social responsibility and increased diversity within their ranks, 
the media also had begun paying more attention to those outside the mainstream, 
including Native Americans. 13 The greater balance in news coverage certainly provided 
the Indian activists of 1973 far greater access to public opinion than the survivors of the 
1890 massacre had, and that access undoubtedly contributed to the government’s 
willingness to listen to the 1973 group’s concerns. 
Longtime Native American journalist Lise Balk King offered her thoughts on the 
1973 siege’s legacy and its impact on the Indian civil rights movement. The event created 
“pride for Indian people, identity with the larger civil rights movement,” she said. 85 It 
also garnered much-needed public and media attention for Indian issues, as well as 
“became a seed for the pan-American Indian political and social identity that unites 
Indian Country today.”  
But the siege also resulted in an intense backlash against Indians by white people 
in South Dakota and surrounding states and led to inter-family and intertribal conflicts 
within tribal communities over the larger meaning and role of AIM in Native American 
society. 85 It also transformed nearly overnight several of the AIM leaders into pop 
culture celebrities, a fact that troubled many traditional Indian people, and it put many 
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Indian communities, especially Sioux communities, in the public spotlight for generations 
to come. “Some people reveled in this new spotlight and new identity,” Balk King said. 
“Others saw it as destructive of the traditional ways of life – too self-aggrandizing and 
self-conscious, not humble.” 85  
But Myron Long Soldier, a leader in the Lincoln, Neb., Indian community, said 
the siege led to a reawakening of Native American identity and civil rights efforts. 86 
“There is a lot more good than bad that came out of it: Indian pride, freedom of religion, 
language restoration, revitalization of tribal laws and treaties with the government.” 86 
Yet another view of the Wounded Knee siege’s legacy comes from John Carter, 
senior research historian for the Nebraska State Historical Society and co-author of 
“Eyewitness at Wounded Knee.” “It was the point where Indian people quit protesting 
and went and got law degrees. Utterly simplistic, but I think utterly true. Indian folks 
went on the offensive.” 87  
Tired of seeing their lands and resources stripped from them with little 
compensation in return, young Native Americans became attorneys in an effort to try to 
regain through the legal system some of what their people had lost. They were lawyers 
like Richard Case, a Cheyenne River Sioux tribal member who sued the federal 
government for stealing his people’s sacred Black Hills of South Dakota. 94 The 
government claimed it had purchased the Black Hills through a Congressional act in 
February 1877, acting on an agreement presented to the Sioux the year before and which 
10 percent of the adult male Sioux population had signed under threat of starvation. 88 In 
1980, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled the government had failed to garner signatures of 
three-fourths of the adult male Sioux population, as required by the Fort Laramie Treaty 
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of 1868. The court awarded the Sioux $105 million for the illegal seizure of their Black 
Hills, money the Sioux have refused to accept as they consider such acceptance would 
cement their loss of the Black Hills. 89 While the court’s decision ultimately failed to 
appease the Sioux, the decision confirmed the tribe’s own determination that the federal 
government had stolen its lands. 88 
Historians Paul Chaat Smith and Robert Allen Warrior offered a similar 
assessment of Wounded Knee’s lasting impact in their seminal book about the American 
Indian Movement, “Like a Hurricane.” They wrote that the Indian activists succeeded in 
embedding cultural pride in a new generation of Native Americans that blossomed into 
ongoing efforts by Indian leaders to force fundamental reassessments of what it meant to 
be Indian, of American history and of tribal communities. 90  
It was a spectacular ride, all the more exciting because no one really knew where 
they were headed. The fast times had more than their share of brilliant mistakes, 
misguided strategies, and foolish bravado. It also was a time of hope and idealism 
when Indians could imagine a university rising from the wreckage of a prison, 
when a bureaucratic fortress could become a Native American embassy, when a 
desperately poor and repressive reservation might become a free and independent 
nation. That a few thousand who fought to bring power and visibility to the most 
ignored population in the United States failed to win all they dreamed can hardly 
be surprising. That they came so close is the miracle. 90 
 
Like the Indians they interviewed and wrote about, the journalists who covered 
the Wounded Knee massacre and the siege 83 years later certainly made mistakes and 
stumbled in their efforts to paint a complete and accurate portrait of the historic events of 
1890 and 1973. They reported false rumors that fed inherent fears of wild Indians 
terrorizing settlers and even other Indians. They blissfully depicted grandiose events 
staged by Indian activists to garner public favor, failing time and again to critically assess 
the meanings and motives of those events. And they often failed to get both sides of the 
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story, whether a result of their own fear of Indians or biases against federal authorities or 
seemingly insurmountable language barriers.  
Still, their stories captivated the nation and the world and shone a spotlight into a 
dark and forgotten corner of one of the country’s most proud and neglected reservations 
and, in doing so, gave Indian people for generations to come hope for better lives for 
themselves and their own children. 
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